The Case For US-RoK-Japan Trilateral Security Cooperation
By Jessica Gott
Korea Defense Veterans Association’s RoK-US Alliance Journal
The necessity for trilateral security cooperation among the United States (U.S.), the Republic of Korea (ROK), and Japan has arguably never been greater as authoritarian nuclear weapon states, North Korea, China, and Russia, have become increasingly belligerent in threatening the stability of the region. As democratic states that imbibe the liberal rules-based world order, it is within the interests of the U.S., ROK, and Japan to maintain strong security cooperation to deter North Korea, China, and Russia from furthering their strategic objectives that move to destabilize the region. However, chief among barriers to trilateral cooperation is the deteriorating ROK-Japan relationship that plays to the interests of the regional authoritarian nuclear states. While tensions remain high in 2020, Japan and the ROK both have incentives to cooperate with the U.S. and one another to prepare for contingencies on the Korean Peninsula. Security analysts warn policymakers that Japan and the ROK must remain mindful of the enduring need for a common defense, because any weakening of cooperation could have severe ramifications if a sudden crisis or outright war were to test the limits of their relationship. Through its actions, it is evident that North Korea, China, and Russia seek to exploit fissures in the U.S. North East alliance system to further their strategic interests. This article seeks to make the case for trilateral security cooperation by displaying how in varying degrees the singular and collaborative destabilizing actions of North Korea, China, and Russia are a threat to the interests of the U.S. and of that of its allies, the ROK and Japan.
The Evolving North Korean Threat
North Korea’s unpredictability as a result of its evolving nuclear and missile programs, Kim Jong Un’s questionable health, and the possibility that North Korea is grappling with COVID-19, mandates U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral cooperation as the unpredictability is a direct threat to all three states and the region. Despite the optimism surrounding the diplomatic thaw of ROK-DPRK and U.S.-DPRK relations in 2018, the United Nations (UN) panel of experts that monitor the implementation of the UN sanctions against North Korea, noted that throughout 2018 and 2019, the DPRK continued to advance its nuclear and missile programs.ii Meanwhile, some regional security experts speculate that Kim Jong Un is growing increasingly impatient with the lack of sanctions relief two years since the Singapore Summit. The argument includes speculation that leading up to the U.S. presidential election, Kim will move to heighten provocations aimed at yielding concessions. Furthermore, Kim has increased his ability to attack both the ROK and Japan by rolling out new ballistic missiles designed for quick strikes. The concern over the DPRK’s evolving nuclear and missile programs also comes as observers continue to question the status of Kim.
Jong Un’s health and the extent of COVID-19 in the DPRK.
Some surmise Kim Jong Un is becoming increasingly unpredictable, even by North Korean standards as he shifts between charm offensives and provocations. The unpredictably of Kim’s actions have included debates surrounding the status of his health as he has spent prolonged periods out of public view. As of 29 June, Kim has been absent for yet another three-week period. It’s the third time Kim has been absent for 21 days or more since rumors about his health emerged in April.iv Japan’s Defense Minister Taro Kono believes Kim to be in poor health and further thinks that he avoids public appearances to avoid being infected with the COVID-19 outbreak that is thought to be wide spread in North Korea.v The expectation that North Korea is grappling with COVID-19 also begs the question of the overall stability of country. In this environment, the U.S., ROK, and Japan need to be prepared for a host of scenarios involving North Korea to include Kim seeking to manufacture a security crisis to maintain his regime’s survivability to the country imploding from the effects of COVID-19.
China and Russia’s Enabling of North Korea’s Brinksmanship
Arguably North Korea is able to further its nuclear and missile programs due to Chinese and Russian support. The 2020 UN North Korea Panel of Experts report notes China and Russia’s continued efforts to assist North Korea’s ability to evade UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions through ship-to-ship transfers that enable the financing of the DPRK’s nuclear and missile programs.vii In addition, arguably the effectiveness of the U.S.-led maximum pressure campaign to incentivize North Korea to seek denuclearization is weakened by the lack of participation by China and Russia. Since the 2018 diplomatic thaw, China and Russia have significantly abstained from criticizing DPRK provocations and have instead called for a revisit of the UNSC sanctions regime.vi Arguably, China and Russia’s actions enable North Korea’s continued brinksmanship, enabling a threat to the interests of the U.S., the ROK, and Japan and necessitating trilateral cooperation to ensure they are collectively prepared for a host of DPRK hostile actions.
The Evolving China and Russia threats
Absent the North Korea threat, China and Russia’s actions in the region singularly and collaboratively pose a threat to the stability of the region. While Russia displays some threat to the region in its continued territory disputes with Japan, it is arguably China that poses the most significant threat to regional stability. China’s rise has been accompanied by moves to expand its influence through militarized territorial expansion in the South China Sea, its hostile actions in the East China Sea, and its moves to end the one country, two systems policy for Taiwan and Hong Kong. China’s actions have threatened the sovereignty of South East Asian nations and have threatened to impede the flow of goods and energy through international sea lanes of communication. In an effort to safeguard its strategic interests, China has also moved to modernize its military and further its opaque nuclear weapon program.ix Meanwhile, as the Center for Strategic Studies Missile Defense Project points out, China’s missile programs already pose a threat to the ROK, Japan, and U.S. bases in the region, further indicating the necessity of a trilateral security cooperation.
The China threat is further complicated by the growing China-Russia strategic partnership. The Chinese state media outlet, Xinhua, notes Chinese and Russian senior military officials have agreed to strengthen military cooperation between their two countries. Several China-Russia military exercises have been conducted in recent years. While both sides avoid naming their strategic partnership a military alliance, observers see the growing military cooperation as similar to a military alliance. Their growing military collaboration in the vicinity of the ROK, Japan, and U.S. military bases was alarmingly displayed during their first combined air patrol that incurred on the aerial identification zone of the disputed ROK/JPN Dokdo/Takeshima Islets. The incursion led to inflaming ROK-Japan tensions over the territory which was arguably among China and Russia’s intent. Regional observers surmise that the Chinese and Russian incursion was meant to send a powerful signal of the developing military leadership between Beijing and Moscow as their joint exercises are becoming larger and more sophisticated in support of their efforts to reshape the region and eventually the world to be more in line with their authoritarian models.
Closing Comments - The Indirect Benefits to Security Cooperation
While the chief benefit to security cooperation entails ensuring the U.S., the ROK, and Japan are prepared to confront threats to their interests from the regional authoritarian nuclear regimes, increased trilateral cooperation could also benefit the U.S., the ROK, and Japan in other areas. Japan and South Korea are arguably experiencing the largest nadir in relations in recent memory. While they have battled overcoming historical animosity, their differences have ventured into the security and economic realms with both citing at one point or another mistrust of the other. The impasse between the governments is also displayed in public opinion as the ROK public views Japan as a more significant threat than the DPRK. Likewise, Japan public opinion of South Korea has recently sunk to a 41 year low. An increase in ROK-JPN security cooperation through a trilateral framework could hopefully serve as a foundation for the ROK and Japan to find common ground. The back and forth between the ROK and Japan is not only detrimental to further trilateral U.S.-ROK-Japan security cooperation but also arguably plays to the interests of the regional authoritarian nuclear states.
